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EXPLAINING THE DECISIONS TO CARRY
OUT PRODUCT AND PROCESS
INNOVATIONS: THE SPANISH CASE
ESTER MARTINEZ-ROS
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
We investigate the determinants of innovation activity making a distinction
between product and process innovations. We analyse a pseudo production
function of innovations where among the explanatory variables, special attention
is paid to firm and market characteristics. The study is applied to a large sample
of Spanish manufacturing firms during the period 1990–1993. There are important
implications arising from the empirical results: 1) Product and process innova-
tions are intimately related independently of the model used in the estimation.
2) The control by unobserved firm effects as the ability and experience of manager
is so important as to affect the conclusions on the managerial decisions about
which type of innovation develop. 3) Given the feedback effects amongst innova-
tion decisions and other factors determining them, it is also very important to
consider a version of the model that allows correlation among those unobserved
effects and explanatory variables. 4) The probability to innovate is higher in
capital intensive firms and in firms with export activities. 5) Market competition
encourages the decision to innovate up to a threshold. vi) The past firm experi-
ence and the managerial quality play a significant role in the probability to
innovate. vii) Product and process innovation decisions are complementary.
Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Inc.
INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the determinants of innovation activity in a large sample
of Spanish manufacturing firms during the period 1990-1993. A distinction is made
between product and process innovations and, among the explanatory variables,
special attention is paid to firm and market characteristics. The analysis incorporates
some important differences regarding to previous works in this field. On the one
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hand, we distinguish different kinds of innovations. On the other, the use of panel
data allows us to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, that is we focus on
the role of unobserved managerial effects and its effects on the decision to innovate.
The reasons for the presence and intensity of innovation activities in firms and
industries have received a lot of attention in the economic literature during the
past 50 years. Most of this research tries to expand the line opened by Schumpeter
(1942). As it is well known, the Schumpeterian hypotheses look at firm’s characteris-
tics (mainly its size as a source of internally generated financial resources) and at
the characteristics of the market (mainly the degree of competition) as the principal
determinants of innovation activity by business firms. Therefore, most of the post
Schumpeterian empirical research has focused in trying to test whether larger firms
in markets with “not too much” competition innovate more than the rest of firms
(see Levin et al., 1985, Kamien & Schwartz, 1982; and Symeonidis, 1996 for complete
surveys of this empirical literature).
Our research in this paper introduces several distinct features in relation to
previous works. First, we measure innovation activity in terms of outputs rather
than in terms of inputs. We count as innovation the report by each firm in the
sample that such activity has actually taken place. Therefore, not only patented
innovations are considered. We believe that the report of product or process innova-
tions is a more complete indicator of innovative activity than the use of the number
of patents, since there are many innovations that are introduced without being
patented. Moreover, with these measures we proxy better the structural features
that originate the adoption of innovations by an organisation (Daft, 1978; Moch &
Morse, 1977).
Second, among the explanatory variables we include a measure of technological
capital which, in fact, implies the estimation of an implicit “production function”
of innovations. The stock of technological capital is constructed using a permanent
inventory model of R&D expenditures over time, with an exogenously given depre-
ciation rate. So, our approach is in line with Hall and Mairesse (1993) or Crepon
and Duguet (1997) and in contrast with Bound et al. (1984), Hall et al. (1986) or
Garcı´a-Montalvo (1993) which use lagged R&D expenditures as inputs, without
taking into account an explicit depreciation rate of capital. Since previous work
with Spanish data has looked at inputs rather than outputs as indicators of innovation
activity, there was no opportunity for estimating production functions.
Third, we consider technological research as a heterogeneous activity that gives
place to distinguish both, product and process innovations. In general, process
innovation will be cost reduction driven, while product innovation is more likely
to be oriented towards product differentiation. Then, one would expect that each
type of innovation will be affected in a different way by the explanatory variables
(Lunn, 1986; Kraft, 1990). Moreover, we can test whether each type of innovation
is independent of the other or, to the contrary, they are jointly determined activities.
Our study, however, departs from other evidence in two ways. First, because of
the availability of panel data; second due to the definition of the technological
variable. Panel data allows us to use estimation methods that try to overcome
possible biases derived from the omission of relevant unobserved firm specific
factors among the explanatory variables. In that sense, we set up the possibility
that the ability of managers influence the extent to which the innovation is adopted
(Amabile, 1983; Leonard-Barton & Deschamps, 1988). However, although the ex-
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pectation firms tend to innovate more if manager behaviour is good , there exist
some evidence that distinguish the different effects according to different types of
innovations (Zmud, 1984). In terms of definition, we distinguish product from
process innovations instead of using others measures—incremental versus radical,
for instance, of Ettlie, Bridges, and O’Keefe (1984), Deward and Dutton (1986) or
Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1998)— because we focus on the output of innovation
rather than on the success of its adoption and because of data limitations.
Fourth, the data used is drawn from the Survey of Business Strategies (ESEE)
provided by the Spanish Industry and Energy Ministry for the period 1990-1993.
Hence, we can follow the same firms over time in each year of the period. This
allows us to construct a balanced panel of data and to carry out an empirical exercise
using a double estimation process. At a first stage, we estimate separately pooled
Probits attending to the two types of innovation and assuming that both, innovation
in process and innovation in product, are not related to each other. Second, we
estimate random effects Probit models. In this case, we consider the existence of
heterogeneous firm effects that could be related with the explanatory variables.
Moreover, we test whether product innovations affect the probability to innovate
in process and vice-versa.
There are important implications arising from the empirical results of the paper.
On the one hand, those related to the statistical procedures used to approach the
problem. They confirm three issues: 1) Product and process innovations are inti-
mately related. 2) The control by unobserved managerial effects is so important as
to affect the conclusions on the effects of almost all variables in the model. 3) Given
the feedback effects amongst innovation decisions and other factors determining
them, it is also very important to consider a version of the model that allows
correlation among unobserved managerial effects and explanatory variables. Sec-
ond, the results have several economic consequences: 1) The probability to innovate
is higher in capital intensive firms and in firms with export activities. 2) Market
competition encourages innovation up to a threshold. 3) The past firm experience
and the managerial quality play a significant role in the probability to innovate. 4)
Product and process innovation decisions are complementary.
The paper contains 4 sections in addition to this introduction. The theoretical
framework is presented in Section 2. Section 3 briefly describes the data used and
presents the empirical specification and the measurement of the variables. Section
4 reports comparisons amongst the results obtained by the different econometric
models, together with the tests of such models. Discussion of results jointly with
some policy implications are reported in Section 5, where we also provide a summary
of the main conclusions.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
The reduced equation model to be estimated explains the expected innovation
decision as a function of the stock of technological capital at the beginning of the
period, of the technological opportunities offered by the market and of other
variables which refer to firm and market characteristics,
E(Iit) 5 f(Git21,t, Xit21) [1]
3
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where I is an innovation indicator, G is the technological capital, t indicates techno-
logical opportunities and X is the rest of explanatory variables.
Equation [1] can be derived as a result of a dynamic optimisation model in which
firms decide on physical inputs, labour and capital and on innovation decisions,
maximising its market value determined by the present value of future cash-flows;
see Reinganum (1989) and Blundell et al. (1995) for further details. However, more
theoretical analysis and explanation is needed to postulate which are the actual
variables in X and how are they expected to determine the dependent variable.
Following the argument of Schumpeter (1942), we find important in the determina-
tion of R&D projects two variables: firm size and market concentration. First, one
expects a positive relationship between firm size and R&D. Second, with a high
market concentration firms find profitable to engage in R&D. Both hypotheses have
been analysed in theoretical and empirical terms obtaining contradictory results.
Our objective is to include both hypotheses in the X determinants of the innova-
tion equation. In fact, we are able to group these determinants into characteristics
of the firm (size, physical capital, degree of capital or price elasticity of demand)
and market conditions (degree of competition).
We expect that the technological capital Git21 will have a positive effect on the
innovation activity, captured by Iit, since the search effort which determines Git21
is intended precisely to be able to improve products and processes. In fact, equation
[1] may be interpreted as a production function of innovations where Git21 is a
measure of the input, and t, Xit21 are proxies which influence the strategic decision
to improve or not products/processes as the market and firm conditions evolve.
Industries with more technological opportunities are expected to encourage inno-
vation activity since the accumulated knowledge, mostly shared by many of the
firms due to spillovers or other effects, reduces the cost of translating knowledge into
new products and processes. But at the same time, it may work against innovation if
the innovating firms consider that the innovation will be imitated by a rival in a
short period of time. So, the net effect is uncertain.
H1: More technological opportunities in the sector, encourage firms
to develop innovation activity.
For a given stock of technological capital and opportunities, the size of the firm
may influence the output of innovations due, for example, to differences in other
physical, human and financial resources across firms with different size. In general,
a positive effect of size on innovation output is expected, since larger firms tend
to be less financially constrained. However, it may also happen that larger firms
view themselves as less threatened by competition and lower the rate of innovation
in order to not to erode profits of current products and processes. Besides, if the
firm has monopoly profits, the incremental profits of innovation will tend to be
relatively lower than in a firm facing more competition.
Previous empirical research has tested the effect of size on innovation activity
with mixed results but, in many of the cases, innovation activity was measured in
terms of inputs rather than outputs.1 The apparent disarray in obtaining consensus
of the effect of firm size on innovation activity responds, in many cases, to the
omission of many controls of firm and market characteristics despite the demon-
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strated importance of such effects (Scott, 1984). The size distribution of firms varies
across industries, in part because of differences in the degree of scale economies
in production and distribution. Thus, there is a good reason to believe that fixed
industry or firm effects are correlated with firm size and that the omission of such
effects will bias the estimates of the effects of size on innovation. Similarly, firm
characteristics such as diversification and some measures of financial capability are
correlated with firm size. So, in order to isolate the size effect on innovation for a
given knowledge stock is important to control for market competitive conditions
and other firm features.
H2: Large firms have more opportunities to engage innovation activity.
The characteristics of the production technology may also affect the decision to
introduce innovations for a given stock of technological capital; one variable used
to differentiate production technologies is the intensity of physical capital. Firms
with more capital intensive technologies will tend to innovate more if, as expected,
the rents of innovation are less threatened as, to exploit the innovation, high
investment in physical capital is required. It may also happen that more capital
intensive processes provide less room for innovation since they are more automated
and rigid. The final effect of capital intensity on innovation activity is uncertain.
Kraft (1990) included only the capital intensity in the product equation obtaining
a positive effect.
H3: More capital intensive firms tend to innovate more.
Production processes may also be differentiated in terms of the degree of vertical
integration. As firms internalise more activities there are more opportunities to
innovate, all the rest equal, and probably there are more incentives to do it if the
results of innovation can be spread over several activities. Although little quantita-
tive work has been done in this area, some case studies suggest the presence of
economies of scope to R&D in vertically related industries. Malerba (1985) studied
the life cycle of technology in the semiconductor industry and found that the
advantages of vertical integration for innovative activity had varied along the cycle.
H4: More vertical integrated firms have more opportunities to inno-
vate.
Another variable, which has been related to innovation activity, is the price elasticity
of demand faced by the firm. As Kamien and Schwartz (1970) showed, the gains
from reducing the cost of production (process innovation) increase as the price
elasticity of demand also increases, in absolute value; but for a given level of
technological capital, the opportunities to innovate may be lower if the production
process is highly standarised. On the other hand, firms with more homogeneous
products (and therefore with many substitutes) may have more opportunities and
incentives to try to introduce product innovations in order to differentiate the
product and soften competition (Spence, 1975).
H5: With an inelastic demand innovating firms prefer to engage in
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process innovations while with an elastic demand they prefer to
carry out product innovations.
Finally, the effect of competition on innovation activity could also have different
signs, given a knowledge stock. The Schumpeter’s proposition supports that firms
in concentrated markets can more easily appropriate the returns from innovations
while Arrow’s hypothesis arguments that firm’s gains from innovation are larger
in a competitive industry than in a monopolistic one. This discussion suggests that
there are many theoretical issues, which will have to be tested empirically in order
to know the sign of the net effect of the explanatory variable. The lack of a clear
theory also reinforces the importance of using econometric estimation procedures
that minimise estimation biases. Acs and Audretsch (1987) found that large firms
are more innovative in concentrated industries with high barriers to entry, while
smaller firms are more innovative in less concentrated industries that are less mature.
Blundell et al. (1995) obtained that innovation activity increases with market share
and decrease with market concentration. Therefore, in the long run an increase in
market share may have a net negative effect on innovation if it also increases market
concentration.
H6: Market competition conditions positively the innovation activity.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Data Description
The data set corresponds to the ESEE conducted over the period 1990-1993 and
surveying over approximately 2,000 firms every year. The survey is an attempt to
know the characteristics of firms belonging to the Manufacture sector, so we are
available information about markets, customers, type of products, levels of employ-
ment, trade and technological activity. It has appeared as an alternative database
existing in Spain in terms that it collects information of firms instead of sectors or
establishments. This is an unbalanced panel since some firms cease to provide
information due to several reasons (mergers, changes to non-industrial activity or
stop in production process). New companies enter the survey each year in an
attempt to maintain representativeness. In particular, it constitutes a mixture data
set where a random sample is drawn up for small companies (with less than 200
employees) while for large firms (greater than 200 employees) the sample is exhaus-
tive. To offer a brief description of this survey we use two indicators: production
activity and firm size.
The production activity refers to industries whose firms belong to and the classifi-
cation corresponds to the NACE-CLIO.2 Although this classification groups firms
into 18 manufacturing sectors, we have aggregated them to 5 for the purposes of
the analysis. The size aggregation is constructed using the number of employees at
December 31. It implies that temporary workers have been weighted by the period
they have been hired by the firm. The ESEE uses specific size intervals: less than
20 workers, between 21 and 50, between 51 and 100, between 101 and 200, between
201 and 500, more than 500. Both the industry classification and the size intervals
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TABLE 1
Number of firms by size and industry1,2
INNOVATING FIRMS
Chem Elec Machin Food Leather Total
,20 workers 76 25 27 35 107 270
21–50 78 27 14 34 134 287
51–100 27 23 13 19 43 125
101–200 39 18 19 17 45 138
201–500 132 59 90 74 128 483
.501 71 40 74 67 25 277
Total 423 192 237 246 482 1580
NON-INNOVATING FIRMS
Chem Elec Machin Food Leather Total
,20 workers 217 52 63 137 345 814
21–50 138 28 50 118 244 578
51–100 45 20 11 35 67 178
101–200 40 15 31 18 59 163
201–500 110 48 53 73 112 396
.501 51 41 23 37 31 183
Total 601 204 231 418 858 2312
Notes.
1. Innovating firms are those which engage product innovation, process innovation or both innovations
at the same time.
2. The 18 sectors of NACE-CLIO classification have been aggregated to 5 in order to simplify the
Table.
are constructed keeping on the sample representativeness as we can observe in
Table 1.
This Table presents a cross tabulation of the sample using industry and firm size
as controls and distinguishing innovating from non-innovating firms.3 During this
period, we have 40% of firms undertaking some innovation activity (only in product,
only in process and both product and process). This description allows us to assess
that the most dynamic sectors within the innovative subsample are Chem and
Leather. In general, large firms (more than 200 employees) innovate more although
we observe an important role of the very small group in developing some technologi-
cal advance. Almost in all innovator sectors, large firms carry out R&D activities
with the exception of the Leather industry, where companies with less than 50
workers have higher activity.
In Table 2, we present mean values for the two innovation activities according
to industry classes and firm size (aggregating size intervals into firms with 200 or
fewer workers and those with more than 200 workers). Moreover, we dissagregate
those firms which only engage in one of these activities from those which do both
simultaneously. In general, column 6 (which reports aggregated figures) shows no
differences in size when firms only innovate in product, while large firms present
clearly higher figures when they only innovate in process. However, when we
observe figures by sectors the behaviour is rather different. In terms of only product
innovation, we do not observe a similar pattern attending to size and industries.
For instance, small firms of Elec, Machin, or Leather industries innovate in product,
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TABLE 2
Frequency of Innovation Activity1
Only Product Innovation
Chem Elec Machin Food Leather Total
Small 0.077 0.183 0.114 0.056 0.110 0.099
Large 0.110 0.074 0.075 0.127 0.054 0.090
Only Process Innovation
Small 0.153 0.135 0.088 0.121 0.116 0.125
Large 0.225 0.090 0.271 0.140 0.233 0.200
Product and Process Innovation
Small 0.103 0.130 0.118 0.077 0.089 0.097
Large 0.223 0.362 0.337 0.295 0.230 0.278
Notes.
1. Figures are mean values for the frequency of innovation by size and sector.
on average, almost double than large firms in the same industries. In contrast, large
firms of Chem and Food develop more product innovations than small ones. In
relation to firms only innovating in process, large firms innovate more in almost
all industries with the exception of Electrical products.
When companies carry out both process and product innovations simultaneously,
large firms engage more R&D activities as regards the last row. In some cases, the
relative frequency is three times larger than that corresponding to small firms (i.e.
figures corresponding to Elec or Machin). This pattern suggests that depending on
the type of innovation activity developed by the firm, the conclusions about the
effects of the determinants can be very different, at least for some determinants at
this very simple descriptive stage.
METHODOLOGY
The empirical model postulates a functional relation between innovation activity
and some explanatory variables which in this paper are grouped into characteristics
of the firms and characteristics of the markets in which the firm operates.
As it has already been mentioned, innovation activity is measured in terms of
output, and particularly in terms of a discrete variable that takes the value of 1 if
the firm has innovated in period t, and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, a distinction is
made between innovations in product and innovations in process. Each type of
innovation is expected to respond differently to the explanatory variables, and
therefore there will be two empirical models to be estimated. Previous papers on
this topic4 have pointed out that technological research and innovation can be
directed towards product or process innovation, but not necessarily towards both.
This, however, has been ignored most of the time in empirical work, where innova-
tion has been considered as an homogeneous activity.
Another important issue is whether there may be some interdependencies be-
tween process and product innovations, in the sense that when firms introduce a
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new product in the market, there will also be a need to improve the production
process. The empirical model will allow for such possible interdependencies.
Since our database contains information about the kind of innovation (product
or process) that the firm engages on, we can separate the innovation output into
these two types. The empirical treatment of the innovation indicator equation [1]
could drive to the estimation of two different specifications: one referred to product
and another one referred to process innovation:
IPROD*it 5 a0Git21 1 a1t 1 a2XFIRMit21 1 a3XMARKETit21 1 e it [2]
IPROC*it 5 b0Git21 1 b1t 1 b2XFIRMit21 1 b3XMARKETit21 1 yit [3]
where IPRODit 5 1 if IPROD*it.0, and IPRODit 5 0 otherwise, in the first equation
and IPROCit 5 1 if IPROCit .0, and IPROCit 5 0 otherwise, in the second equation.
The error terms have the following structure e it 5 hi 1 uit and vit 5 mi 1 wit with
uit and wit satisfying standard conditions. Moreover, the dependent variables are
simple indicators (dummy variables) of whether or not a firm engages in product
and/or process innovation. Moreover, we are interested in checking whether the
development of process innovations affects the probability of innovating in product
and vice-versa. Consequently, we estimate both equations introducing the alter-
native lagged innovation indicator (IPROCit21 in equation [2], IPRODit21 in equa-
tion [3]).
Notice that innovation activity is conditioned on the technological capital stock
of the firm Git21. This implies that equations [2] and [3] can be interpreted as
production functions of innovations, where XFIRM and XMARKET are explana-
tory variables of the innovation activity of the firm, for a given capital stock. Some
of the firm and market characteristics included in XFIRM and XMARKET may
also affect the capital stock Git21, i.e., this stock is also endogenous. To account for
this, Git21 will be instrumented by its prediction GINSTit21. We construct GINST
regressing Git21 on industry dummies, time dummies, firm characteristics, market
characteristics and the past knowledge stock under the assumption that the error
term is not autocorrelated.
We are going to address the different questions posed in this paper in two steps.
First, we implement individual discrete choice models for a general innovation
indicator and for each innovation decision. This allows us to check whether dissa-
gregating different kinds of innovations matter. In this approach, we do not consider
the possible influence of unobserved heterogeneity, but we only estimate pooled
probit models. In a second step, we try to overcome such problem, by estimating
single probit models controlling for the presence of unobserved firm effects as
managerial ability, experience, or other factors that remain constant along the
period. We also allow for the potential cross-effects of both innovation types.5
Details of the econometric procedure are reported in Martı´nez-Ros (1998).
MEASUREMENT OF THE VARIABLES
The indicator variables follow the observability rules: IPROD takes value 1 if firm
carry out product innovations and zero otherwise and IPROC takes value 1 if firm
develop process innovations, and zero otherwise.
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The technological knowledge stock (G) captures previous R&D effort done by
the firm affected by a depreciation rate. It is constructed as:
Git 5 Sit 1 (1 2 d)Git21 [4]
where Sit is the R&D expenditure of firm i in period t and d is the depreciation
rate.6 This specification basically follows the reasoning of Griliches and Mairesse
(1984) or Hall (1990) in the sense that all search contributes towards the innovation
stock by generating a constant stream of incremental innovations. This search
process story is called leaky bucket and implies that the decision about innovating
(or the number of innovations obtained) evolves according to the indicator function
[1] (or a count equation when Iit is observed).7
Technological opportunity, t, reflects the influences of technological push in the
industry (Lunn, 1986). We approximate it using the industry knowledge stock minus
the own firm R&D expenditure (SPILL). It is constructed using [4] where S refers
now to R&D expenditures at industry level normalised by the industry sales net
of firm sales. Notice that it captures an externality of R&D capital as Crepon and
Duguet (1997) pointed out. The sign of the coefficient of this variable in the empirical
model is ambiguous, since in an industry with high level of R&D activity there will
also be more spillovers which may facilitate the innovation activity; but it may also
happen that firms are in advantageous positions to imitate the innovations of other
rivals in the industry and if this is the case, innovation activity may be showed.
The XFIRM vector includes a list of characteristics of the firm which may influ-
ence the decision to innovate, for a given technological capital of the firm: size,
production technology, vertical integration, export activity and foreign ownership.
Size of the firm is measured by the natural log of the number of employees
(LnEMP). In general, larger firms will have more complementary resources of the
technological capital (financial, physical, commercial, . . . ) and therefore, a positive
effect of size in the probability of innovation is expected, both in product and in
process. However, larger firms may be subject to more bureaucratic controls and
dysfunction which may affect negatively their capacity to translate capital stock
into innovations. Moreover, if size is positively associated with market power, the
incremental benefits of innovation may be relatively lower for larger firms than for
smaller ones (Pavitt et al., 1987) and, specifically, could influence more in product
innovating firms than in process innovating firms.
The production technology is proxied by the ratio of sales to fixed assets of the
firm (KSA).8 A higher value of the ratio means that the production process is
relatively more capital intensive. More capital intensive process may make more
difficult to improve current product and process, because the production process
is less suitable for adjustments and manipulations than in more labour intensive
technologies. On the other hand, the introduction of new production technologies
gives the opportunity to change current products and processes and therefore to
innovate. So, the actual relation between capital intensity of the production process
and innovation activity may be considered an empirical issue.
The degree of vertical integration of the firm will be measured, inversely, by the
ratio of purchases to other firms divided by the total value of production, both
variables defined in a yearly basis (CISP). As we indicated above, as the firm
performs more activities internally, there are more opportunities to innovate and
therefore a negative sign of the variable CISP is expected.
A dummy variable (DEXP), which takes the value of 1 when the firm exports
10
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and 0 otherwise, is used to describe the export activity of the firm. We expect that
export activity favours innovation, as their presence in foreign markets may require
more innovations in order to be competitive. But it is also true that firms with more
innovation activity may have more incentives to export since they also have more
intangible resources to sustain growth. So, no clear direction of the causality may
be established.
Finally, a dummy variable (CAPEXT) is used to indicate if the firm is controlled
by foreign ownership (50% or more). This is a control variable for which no clear
sign can be expected from the theory.
On the other hand, the XMARKET variables pick up industry shifters, which
try to characterise the market structure.9 We will refer first to the degree of competi-
tion in the product market proxied, inversely, by market concentration. In general,
the empirical evidence supports Schumpeter’s arguments that firms in concentrated
markets can more easily appropriate the returns from inventive activity. Others
works find evidence that market concentration do not promote R&D because the
expected incremental innovating rents are larger in competitive markets than under
monopoly conditions (Arrow, 1962; Bozeman & Link, 1983). The discussion about
the right sign of this variable needs to be related to the endogeneity of the measure
used in the empirical analysis, i.e. the concentration ratio. As Levin and Reiss
(1984) and Levin et al. (1985) showed, the endogeneity of concentration produces
biases in the estimates of the effect over innovation activity. To avoid the possible
endogeneity bias of the concentration variable, the intensity of market competition
will be approximated, in an inverse way, by the average gross profit market of the
industry (AVGMBE), in order to capture whether market competition encourages
innovation activity. A positive sign would give support to Schumpeter’s hypothesis
while a negative sign would be in accordance with Arrow’s predictions. The introduc-
tion of this variable in both innovation equations also allows us to test for different
effects of market competition in product and process innovation (Lunn, 1986; Kraft,
1990).10 We include the squared of gross profit market (AVGMBE2) in order to
capture possible non-linearities in the market competition.
Another characteristic of the market that may affect innovation activity is the
growth of demand (Schmookler,1966). A dummy variable RECES is defined which
takes the value of 1 when the market of the firm is in a recession and 0 otherwise.
The theory predicts that growth of demand encourages innovation and therefore
a negative coefficient for RECES is expected.
The homogeneity of product is captured by a dummy variable (EP) that takes
the value of 1 when firm produces a standard product and 0 otherwise. This variable
is proxying the elasticity of demand because standard products are viewed as homo-
geneous products and, hence, with a more elastic demand. The theory suggests that
the production of product innovations needs to elastic demands (Spence, 1975),
while the production of process innovation enhances with inelastic demands (Ka-
mien & Schwartz, 1970).
Finally, we control possible shocks common to all industries using time dummies.
We also control time invariant firm effects in the models estimated using the panel
nature of the data. The unobserved effects hi and yi would be recovering managerial
quality, firm experience in doing R&D activities, ability in internal organisation,
etc., in the production of innovations. We expect for example, that higher quality
in the management, higher probability to innovate.
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TABLE 3
Probits Results (Pooled Data)1,2
Dependent Variable: INNOVA IPROD IPROC
Intercept 21.012 21.574 21.540 21.260 21.266
(4.06) (5.88) (5.67) (4.94) (4.88)
IPRODt21 0.454
(7.66)
IPROCt21 0.518
(8.72)
KSAt21 20.005 20.007 20.006 20.004 20.003
(3.29) (2.85) (2.78) (2.28) (2.07)
GINSTt21 0.206 0.351 0.370 0.037 0.021
(2.68) (4.01) (4.20) (0.41) (0.23)
SPILLt21 20.012 0.008 0.007 20.011 20.010
(0.32) (0.20) (0.20) (0.29) (0.26)
DEXPt21 0.461 0.513 0.482 0.264 0.202
(7.75) (7.91) (7.33) (4.28) (3.22)
AVGMBEt21 0.050 0.061 0.060 0.036 0.033
(1.45) (1.63) (1.58) (1.02) (0.94)
AVGMBE2t21 20.256 20.345 20.335 20.162 20.141
(1.81) (2.20) (2.11) (1.11) (0.96)
InEMPt21 0.141 0.106 0.069 0.192 0.179
(6.83) (4.93) (3.13) (9.11) (8.39)
EPt21 0.006 0.236 0.275 20.176 20.200
(0.12) (4.07) (4.68) (3.27) (3.69)
RECESt21 20.092 20.106 20.114 20.108 20.105
(1.67) (1.76) (1.88) (1.88) (1.82)
CAPEXTt21 20.014 0.015 0.019 0.021 0.018
(0.20) (0.22) (0.27) (0.31) (0.27)
CISPt21 20.129 20.151 20.132 20.145 20.131
(1.03) (1.20) (1.02) (1.14) (0.99)
Notes.
1. All estimations include time dummies.
2. t-ratios in brackets
FINDINGS
We try to answer the questions posed in the previous sections of this paper using
the estimation methods outlined above. It is important to notice that the interpreta-
tion of the obtained results will be different if we control for unobserved firm effects
or not. These heterogeneous effects are considered random along the different
specifications because of the number of firms involved in the exercise. It is reasonable
to think that if these variables (for instance, managerial ability) are important in the
decision to innovate, falling to control them would provide inconsistent parameter
estimates. However, the pooled probit results of Table 3 should still be consistent
if firm specific effects do not matter. But this is not a plausible assumption in a
model that determines innovation frequencies. In order to take account of this fact,
we estimate random effects probit models whose results are reported in Table 4.
Moreover, we test whether product and process innovations are independent of
each other.
12
Product and Process Innovations 235
TABLE 4
Probits Results (Panel Data)1
Dependent Variable: IPROD IPROC
IPRODt21 0.262
(24.9)
IPROCt21 0.278
(26.5)
KSAt21 0.005 0.003
(6.76) (3.44)
GINSTt21 0.263 0.002
(27.9) (0.18)
SPILLt21 0.011 20.079
(1.85) (14.5)
DEXPt21 0.174 0.108
(9.27) (6.34)
AVGMBEt21 0.059 0.039
(10.5) (7.61)
AVGMBE2t21 20.306 20.191
(13.5) (9.27)
lnEMPt21 0.041 0.185
(2.07) (10.3)
RECESt21 20.068 20.074
(6.46) (7.76)
CAPEXTt21 20.031 20.123
(1.06) (4.63)
CISPt21 20.193 20.122
(7.72) (5.40)
Notes.
1. t-ratios in brackets.
2. Random effects probit model (correlation amongst effects and variables; i.e., two stage within-groups
using Chamberlain’s method). Heteroscedasticity allowed.
We are interested in answering the following questions. First, we like to test
whether estimating pooled discrete choice models on total innovations produces
different results from those obtained considering each type of innovation separately.
We use univariate probit models without controlling for heterogeneity to conduct
these tests. Second, we would like to test the simultaneity between both types of
innovation.11 If managerial ability is correlated with physical capital stock, for exam-
ple, we will get biased estimates. Moreover, this is going to happen in the presence
of feed-backs amongst innovation decisions and explanatory variables.
Our first concern is about the homogeneity between the models that explain
product and process innovations. Table 3 presents the probit results of three empiri-
cal specifications, which allow us to test for such hypotheses. The second issue is
about the simultaneity between the two innovation activities. The results of Table
3 confirm such simultaneity where past process (product) innovation indicator
affects the probability of current product (process) innovation. Finally, the last
concern is about the relevance of the firm specific effects.12 The results presented
in Table 4 introduce firm specific effects in the probit estimation under the assump-
tion that the effects are random and correlated with the other explanatory variables.
The more general specification of the models with fixed effects justifies that we
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take the results of Table 4 as the relevant ones to test the theoretical predictions.
However, it will also be econometrically and economically relevant to understand
the discrepancies between the results presented in the different tables.
In addition, to interpret the differences among the results in Tables 3 and 4 in
terms of correlation among unobserved and observed variables, we must also bear
in mind that the within groups procedure transforms the variables to differences
from firm time means. Therefore, as regards the pooled models, the within groups
results indicate whether changes in variables at the firm level affect the innovation
decisions.
Table 4 report results allowing for heteroscedasticity and correlated effects.
Notice that those results are provided using the within-groups transformation (in
order to rule out the effects) after obtaining reduced form predictions for the
innovation decisions. Therefore, as a consequence of within groups transformation,
all variables without time variation are also ruled out while estimating. On the other
hand, the correlation amongst effects and variables is confirmed while estimating the
reduced form models.13
We must look carefully at the results in Tables 3 and 4 for two reasons. First,
results do not directly evaluate the effects on innovations of their main determinants.
Second, specifications [2] and [3] are the indicator counterparts of the production
functions of innovations, conditional on a given level of technological stock. Conse-
quently, the coefficients should also be interpreted conditional on these levels.
Given the first reason above, we provide in Table 5 the marginal effects of each
variable on innovation probabilities, ceteris paribus.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Given the comments on the preceding section, we can focus on the discussion of
the main results reported in Table 4. In particular, we concentrate on whether we
reject or fail to reject the hypotheses set up in the theoretical model. Moreover,
we also compare these results with the alternative specifications (Table 3) in order
to illustrate how the omission of the correlation amongst firm specific effects and
other explanatory variables affects the estimated coefficients. The expected result
that innovation cannot be seen as a homogeneous activity is clearly confirmed in
Table 3. Both types of innovations are determined in a different way, for the case
of Spanish manufacturing firms. For a given technological stock, we observe a major
impact of export activity in the probability to innovate in product that in process.
On the other hand, firm size affects much more the decision to innovate in process
than in product. Whether there is a recession in the output market, both activities
are affected negatively in a same magnitude.
Finally, Table 3 allows us to estimate the coefficient of EP, a variable for which
we have only information available for 1990. The empirical evidence indicates that
firms producing and selling standarised products (EP 5 1), have a higher probability
to innovate in product and a lower probability to innovate in process. Product
innovation gives the opportunity to differentiate the product and increase profits,
and this increase will probably be relatively higher for firms which have a more
standarised product to begin with. The negative coefficient of EP in the process
innovation equation can be interpreted as that the cost reducing due to process
14
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innovations increase relatively profits when the product is not differentiated, and
therefore the price elasticity of demand is higher in absolute terms (Kamien &
Schwartz, 1970). In that sense, H5 is confirmed.
The assumption that firm specific effects do not matter, is rejected. We confirm
this result when comparing the coefficients in Tables 3 and 4. These comparisons
should be done amongst the estimates in columns 3 and 5 of Table 3 with respect
to those in Table 4. The control of managerial ability and experience in developing
innovation activity really affect the influences of explanatory variables on the deci-
sions to innovate, except for firm size and demand growth. Once taking account
managerial ability, the experience repercussion on innovation reduces considerably.
Anyway, we continue observing innovation as a heterogeneous activity.
Within Table 4, the empirical evidence is in favour of the hypothesis of correlation
between firm specific effects and other explanatory variables. Blundell et al. (1995)
also found evidence of such correlation. This correlation is different along the
determinants of both innovation types. While we observe positive correlation among
managerial ability and the regressors related to external markets (DEXP and CA-
PEXT), this pattern is not maintained with respect to others determinants. We
could justify this behaviour since in exporting firms and in those with high foreign
capital participation rates the managerial ability is more disciplined by the market.
On the other hand, the effect of these variables on the two decisions are different.
We observe a larger (lower) impact of export activity (foreign ownership) in product
innovation.
Allowing for correlation among firm effects and KSA, more capital intensive
firms show higher innovation activity, thus confirming H3. This means that the
ability of the manager affects inversely the probability to innovate likely because
those firms are more rigid and hierarchical.
As expected and stated in H4, higher vertical integration is associated with higher
innovation activity, both in product and in process innovations (the coefficient of
CISP, purchases over production, is negative). However, while the ability of the
manager is positively correlated with firms which are low vertical integrated in the
decision of doing product innovation activity, it is negatively correlated with the de-
cision of engaging process innovation activity. Firms with higher vertical integration
need a bigger effort of board equipment in doing process innovations.
Among the explanatory variables which capture industry-market effects, we ob-
serve a negative coefficient of the industry R&D activity, SPILL, on process innova-
tion. This result contrasts with the evidence often detected of a positive relationship
between firm and industry R&D expenditures. This positive association has been
interpreted as a positive effect of technological opportunities on R&D activity. The
negative coefficient of SPILL in the probit estimation would be interpreted in
terms of negative incentives to innovate, for a given stock of technological capital,
due to the increasing facilities to imitate the innovation as the technological opportu-
nities of the market (more intensity of R&D) also increases. This interpretation
would also be consistent with the evidence that the absolute value of the coefficient
of SPILL is larger in process innovations than in product innovations. Consequently,
these results reject H1.
We observe that the behaviour of market competition on the decisions to innovate
is not monotonic. There exists a threshold of competition (which is estimated to
be significantly equal to the mean of AVGMBE) that determines the degree of
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influence. With high competition, the probability to innovate grows because in the
output market there exists opportunities of success in developing innovations, but
when market competition achieves the threshold, we observe that the probability
to innovate decreases. Again, we detect correlation between managerial ability and
market competition. These results compare with Blundell et al. (1995) that found
a positive effect of competition on innovation activity and Kraft (1990) that reports
an effect of market structure on product innovation but not in process innovation.
We fail to reject H6 taking into account the two coefficients.
The effect of size on innovation is always higher for process innovations indicating
that large firms have more facilities (internal capabilities, resources) to innovate in
process than in product. So, for a given stock of technological capital, size increases
are always associated with increases in innovation activities, confirming that larger
firms are in a better situation than smaller ones when translating R&D effort into
process innovations (H2). This result contrast with the empirical evidence often
found on a “U inverted” relationship.14 On the other hand, firms in recessive product
markets innovate less than firms in markets where demand grows or is stable. This
evidence is consistent with Schmookler’s thesis that innovation is demand-push.
Finally, we are also interested in testing the complementarity (in probability)
between innovation measures. We have introduced, as explained in the empirical
analysis, predetermined alternative innovation indicator variables in order to test
this hypothesis. Process innovation has an important role in the probability to
innovate in product as well as product innovation has it in the innovation in process,
and the size of those effects are reduced when we have into account the unobserved
firm effects. One could consider that the experience in doing innovation as a specific
firm effect is positively correlated with the production of innovations in the past.
In particular, it is possible that the production of new product inventions could be
more affected by the experience than the development of production processes. It
would be coherent with Kraft’s results, although both the measurement of technical
variables and the estimation methods are different. However, Kraft only finds
evidence in one direction, i.e. he only shows a positive impact of product-innovation
on process-innovation. We provide evidence for the reverse effect: process innova-
tion has positive effect on product innovation which is in line with the simultaneity
of both activities.
As a conclusion of this paper we summarise in Table 5, the marginal effects of
the explanatory variables on the probability to innovate in product and process,
conditional on a given level of a knowledge stock. A change of regime from non-
innovating to innovating in process in the last year increases the probability of
innovating in product by 27.3%. The experience in product innovations encourages
the process innovation probability in 36.3%. Therefore, capital intensive firms and
exporters produce major product innovations, given a knowledge stock, but large
firms produce major process innovations. A 1% increment in employment level
produces only an increment of 1.5% in the probability to innovate in product while
a 5.2% in the probability to innovate in process. The effect of competition degree
is double in firms doing product innovation with respect those carrying out process
innovations, indicating that increases in competition affects more to the production
of new products by the threat of imitation On the other hand, the technological
opportunity has a negative influence only on process innovation. A demand reces-
sion reduces the probability to innovate in similar magnitude in both innovation
16
Product and Process Innovations 239
TABLE 5
Marginal Effects Conditional on a Given Knowledge Stock1,2
IPROD IPROC
IPRODt21 0.363
IPROCt21 0.273
KSAt21 0.002 0.001
GINSTt21 0.096 0.000
SPILLt21 0.003 20.023
DEXPt21 0.063 0.029
AVGMBEt21 0.021 0.011
AVGME2t21 20.111 20.052
lnEMPt21 0.015 0.050
RECESt21 20.025 20.020
CAPEXTt21 20.011 20.034
CISPt21 20.070 20.033
Notes.
1. Figures are calculated at sample means.
2. The marginal effects are evaluated as the product of the density function at maximum likelihood
estimators and the corresponding estimate. For dummy variables (IPROD, IPROC, DEXP, RECES
and CAPEXT), we calculate probabilities at the two regimes and the marginal effect is the increase
(decrease) of changing from regime 1 (innovate) to regime 0 (do not innovate).
activities. Finally, we confirm Malerba’s hypothesis that higher vertical production
control implies higher probability to innovate. Approximately, 1% change in vertical
integration increases 7% the probability to innovate in product and 3% that corre-
sponding to process.
Results obtained in this exercise allow us to conclude that Spanish firms do not
differ a lot from other industrialised countries when we test hypotheses using the
same measures of technological change (Brouwer & Kleinknecht (1998) for Europe
and Arundel and Kabla (1998) for Italy, for instance).
The added value of this paper could be summarised in two points. First, we
estimate an implicit production function of innovation where the determination
of output innovations is function of firm characteristics and market conditions.
Moreover, we check that technological activity is not homogeneous so we estimate
two equations: one for product innovations and other for process innovations.
Second, the availability of having panel data allows us to use estimation methods
that overcome possible biases derived from the omission of relevant unobserved
firms specific variables among the explanatory variables. On the other hand, we
leave for a further research the possibility to extent the study by using other
measures of the innovation output.
NOTES
1. Pavitt et al. (1987) found that innovation intensity was greater for large firms and
small firms, and smaller for medium-sized, in the UK industry. In contrast, Soete (1979)
suggested that R&D intensity increased with size in a number of sectors in the US. Blundell
et al. (1993) using the innovation counts found that higher market share firms innovate more,
while firms in competitive industries tend to have a greater probability to innovate.
17
240 THE JOURNAL OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT RESEARCH VOL. 10/ NO. 2/1999
2. NACE is a general industrial classification of economic activities within the European
Community and CLIO is the Classification and Nomenclature of Input-Output table. Both
classifications are officially recognised by the Accounting Economic System.
3. Innovating firms are those that in the period develop at least one type of innovation:
product, process or both simultaneously. Non-innovating firms are those that do not engage
in any innovation activity in the period. Innovation is defined according to direct question
formulated to the firm in the questionnaire, as “Do you carry out product/process innovations?
So, this calls both for radical and incremental innovations although the interviewer should
try to control for minimum incremental innovation.
4. See Link (1982), Scherer (1983), Link and Lunn (1984), Lunn (1986) or Kraft (1990).
5. It is possible, for instance, to consider both the influences of the latent and observed
product indicator on the decision to innovate in process and vice-versa. In the first case, the
interpretation is that not only the output but also the probability matter while in the second,
the assumption is that the information of previous periods is perfectly now in the current
period.
6. As in other studies, we use a depreciation rate equal to 30%. We normalise by firm
sales after obtaining G.
7. Alternatively, we could assume that knowledge stock is obtained using number of
patents or number of innovations as in Blundell et al. (1995).
8. It measures the replacement value of the firm’s machinery capital stock following the
traditional literature about the measurement of capital stock while constructing it (Blundell et
al. 1992).
9. A typical variable employed to measure the market structure is the concentration.
Cohen and Levin (1989) offer a complete overview of the relationship between R&D and
concentration and an extensive discussion about the ambiguous predictions obtained in
empirical studies.
10. These authors separate process from product innovation and find opposite results.
While in Lunn (1986), concentration is precisely estimated only in the process equation,
Kraft (1990) finds that concentration only affects to the product equation.
11. The statistics of the main variables (see Martı´nez-Ros, 1998) reveals that the two
sets of firms are very similar. Two reasons seem to justify this behaviour. First, the data
correspond to the same companies or, second, both activities seem to be complements more
than substitutes.
12. We consider the lagged observed variable of the alternative equation affects the
contemporary decision to innovate. The results of these models are valid under not correlated
mixed error terms. We also need absence of correlation between the individual component
of the product equation and the lagged process indicator and the individual component of
the process equation and the lagged product indicator. These last assumptions are relaxed
in the estimation of Table 4.
13. We observe that the coefficients (sign and significance) change when moving from
a specification without firm specific effects to a specification considering them.
14. See Pavitt et al. (1987).
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